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Introduction
The development of Ukraine as an independ-
ent state is connected with complicated transfor-
mation processes typical of most post-communist 
states in Central and Eastern Europe. However, 
the situation of Ukraine after the collapse of the 
communist system turned out to be more chal-
lenging than that of its neighbours. Generally 
speaking, Ukraine has been going through three 
phases of social transformation at once. First, the 
decolonisation of governance is taking place. The 
system of government must be reorganised in 
accordance with national and not imperial inter-
ests. Second, the decentralisation of government 
facilitates an evolution from the totalitarian to a 
democratic regime. Third, the denationalisation 
of the economy, which is also under way, results 
in the rejection of a directive type of adminis-
tration in favour of regulation and stimulation 
(Kučabs´kij 2010).
According to Mach (1998), there are four types 
of East-European post-communist transforma-
tion:
1. Substitution. This type implies that the essence 
of institutional changes in post-communist 
European countries is based on modernisa-
tion. This means a substitution of centralised 
and rigidly managed economy, its political 
superstructure and the social consequenc-
es involved with a modern West-European 
capitalist model. As a necessary element, this 
approach assumes a rapid and ultimate aban-
donment of the old communist model.
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2. Transplantation, which can exist in two ver-
sions. One presumes that in the process of 
East-European transformation certain ele-
ments of the old order remain unchanged. 
The other allows the continuing existence of 
the old institutional structure in which only 
certain elements of the new system are imple-
mented.
3. Recombination, which implies that neither in-
stitutions nor individuals are able to perform 
rapid radical changes. For this reason the 
transformation of post-communist European 
countries means modification and re-configu-
ration of those individual elements that exist-
ed in the economy and society when the trans-
formation was launched.
4. Retrogression, which presumes a justified 
threat that the process of transformation can 
actually mean a return to organisational and 
mental forms of the pre-transformation times 
and thus steer the transformation itself to-
wards collectivism and authoritarianism, and 
generate fear of the future.
The multidirectional nature of transforma-
tion processes, as well as their overlapping, un-
dermined the stability of public institutions in 
Ukraine. This, in turn, led to a prolonged social 
and economic crisis. As a result, Ukraine failed 
to achieve essential correspondence between 
new social values and priorities and public ad-
ministration methods that often remain totali-
tarian. As Lesečko and Čemeris claimed (2001: 
95), “Ukraine has found itself on the verge of a 
peripheral zone, and it is becoming more and 
more problematic for it to rise in the global hi-
erarchy”. Thus, to use Mach’s terminology, the 
post-communist transformation processes in 
Ukraine that were initially planned as transplan-
tation and later entered the recombination phase 
have recently acquired explicit features of retro-
gression. At the same time, it must be noted that 
the process of curtailing democratic changes is 
non-linear. Massive public and political protests 
of 2004, known as the Orange Revolution, for 
a short time disrupted this negative tendency. 
However, due to a number of reasons and first 
of all a destructive impact of the global economic 
crisis on the Ukrainian economy, pro-democrat-
ic political forces lost the political support of the 
majority of voters and transformed into an oppo-
sition. The signing of the European Union Asso-
ciation Agreement planned for 2013 was viewed 
as another chance to renew democratic changes 
in Ukraine. A unilateral decision of the Ukrain-
ian government to postpone the signing of this 
Agreement and a sharp change in the country’s 
geopolitical course, now targeted at building 
closer relations with the Russian Federation, led 
to new large-scale protests and attempts of the 
regime in power to suppress them by force.
At the moment when this paper is submitted 
for publication (February 2014), it is not clear yet 
if the recent public unrest will be able to push 
Ukrainian society towards transplantation or 
if the country will keep drifting towards retro-
gression. At the same time, it is obvious that in 
Ukraine the process of recombination in its cur-
rent form has exhausted itself. 
Initial situation, causes and 
consequences of transformation 
problems
Before 1991 the disappearance of the Soviet 
Union as a state did not seem to be a realistic geo-
political prospect. At that time, the separation of 
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia posed the greatest 
threat to the USSR. However, it was the political 
crisis of 1991 and the failure of the military coup 
in August 1991 that discredited the Kremlin’s po-
litical power and gave an impulse to the collapse 
of the country. In 1991 the majority of former 
USSR dependencies acquired features of formal 
and later informal independence as individual 
states. This process was finalised in December 
1991 when Ukraine became an independent enti-
ty of international politics that inherited from the 
USSR the old system of public (and territorial) 
administration (Fig. 1).
At the time when Ukraine gained independ-
ence in 1991, it was characterised by a number of 
specific features that affected its further transfor-
mation.
Internal disintegration
Although Ukraine consisted of territories in-
habited mainly by Ukrainians, its regions had 
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significant political, social and economic fea-
tures. Sometimes those features were clearly 
destructive. This situation is explained by the 
history of Ukraine’s border-setting in 1920–1954 
that was determined by the geopolitical will of 
the Kremlin’s political leaders. The emergence of 
Ukraine in 1991 was a geopolitical compromise 
rather than a result of the political will for inde-
pendence expressed by the majority of its popu-
lation. According to the Soviet referendum about 
the preservation of the Soviet Union that took 
place on 17 March 1991, only 20% of voters in the 
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (mainly in 
Western Ukraine) had the courage to vote against 
it. However, the outcome of the Ukrainian ref-
erendum of 1 December 1991 was the opposite: 
90.3% voted for the independence of Ukraine and 
against its being part of the Soviet Union. That 
proved how undetermined the citizens of the fu-
ture Ukrainian state were in their vision of the 
country’s political future and how big the danger 
of manipulation of the Ukrainian voters was.
At the same time, the Ukrainian referendum 
of December 1991 was recorded in history as the 
first democratic plebiscite held in the country in 
seventy years. It pointed to obvious territorial 
differences as regards the imagined political fu-
ture of the country (Fig. 2).
However, as opposed to Belarus that irre-
versibly entered the retrogression phase in 1993, 
Ukraine long strived for democratic transfor-
mations by transplantation or recombination. 
Traditionally, most voters in today’s Ukraine 
politically support democratisation and Euro-
pean integration while residents of a specific, 
geographically compact part of the country are 
inclined to preserve the authoritative model and 
a pro-Russian policy.
The main civilisational split of modern 
Ukraine divides it into two major parts: Central 
Western and South-Eastern ones. A specific fea-
ture of Ukraine is lack of a geographical border-
line between different parts of the country. Typ-
ically, they are separated by a broad transition 
zone, and in each of the two regions we can ob-
serve considerable enclaves and intrusions with 
characteristic features of the other one. In order to 
visualise these peculiarities, one might compare 
Fig. 1. Administrative division of Ukraine
Source: Kučabs´kij (2010: 152)
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the territorial breakdown of Victor Yushchenko’s 
support during the presidential election of 2004 
(Fig. 3) and an almost diametrically opposite dis-
tribution of support for Victor Yanukovych dur-
ing the presidential election of 2010 (Fig. 4). For 
the first time, the referendum of 1 December 1991 
demonstrated this division in an explicit way. 
Later it was only confirmed by the results of all 
political elections in the country.
Dejč (2005: 21) makes a conclusion about too 
high a level of political differentiation in Ukraine 
and sees a crucial difference of systemic elements 
in the “mentality as a way of these elements to 
create stable systems”. Kordun (2006: 167) claims 
that internal civilisational differences in Ukraine 
can be explained, among others, by “different 
visions of the same historical events and lead-
ers, a selection of different models of behaviour, 
and even by essentially different assessment of 
the very fact of Ukrainian independence in dif-
ferent regions of the country”. Majboroda (2006: 
121) believes that “it is not possible to downplay” 
those regional differences.
However, internal differences in Ukraine are 
illustrated not only by the above dual split. For 
example, democratically-minded Central West-
ern Ukraine consists of mentally and culturally 
heterogeneous regions. The westernmost regions 
that were forced to join the USSR (and Soviet 
Ukraine) as a result of World War II remain most 
pro-Western and pro-democratic. This refers in 
particular to Galicia, which used to be part of the 
Habsburg monarchy and later interwar Poland, 
Volyn, a former part of the Romanov Empire 
and Poland, zakarpattia (Transcarpathia), which 
after the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy be-
came part of Czechoslovakia and then Hungary, 
and finally Bukovyna, which used to be in the 
Habsburg monarchy and later in Romania.
The South-Eastern part of Ukraine that was 
most severely affected by the destructive power 
of the communist administration remains more 
homogeneous. The main circumstances that 
shaped the current image of that region include 
Stalinist collectivisation and industrialisation. 
Collectivisation and a few periods of famine ru-
Fig. 2. Percentage of voters who supported independence during the referendum on 1 December 1991 (out of the total num-
ber of voters)
Source: http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/15r-V_Ref/index.php?11 (modified)
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ined the traditional Ukrainian way of country life 
and contributed to a social and economic degra-
dation of the agricultural periphery. On the other 
hand, industrialisation contributed to the devel-
opment and dynamic growth of major industrial 
centres with an ethnically mixed (although main-
ly Ukrainian-Russian) population recruited from 
different parts of the USSR and emotionally not 
involved in efforts to establish a Ukrainian state.
However, in this region we can also identi-
fy individual specific parts. First of all, there is 
Crimea and Sevastopol with a dominant ethnic 
Russian population and an influential number of 
Crimean Tatars. The Donbas area deserves spe-
cial attention. It is a typical and obvious product 
of Stalin’s industrialisation since it specialises in 
all stages of coal-mining and coal-processing. Al-
though statistically this region is represented as a 
Russian-Ukrainian mixture, in fact it is exclusive-
ly Russian-speaking and considerably uprooted. 
The ethnically diverse southern Bessarabia is an-
other Ukrainian region that differs from the rest 
of the country. This area was finally incorporated 
into the USSR in 1944, and during the collectiv-
isation and famine of 1946–1947 suffered severe 
social, economic, and demographic destruction.
It is obvious that in addition to a geographi-
cal split there are other differences. First, there is 
an ethnic and a linguistic diversity. According to 
Nadolìšnìj (1999: 147–148), the issue of the eth-
nic composition of the population is particular-
ly important when the state is being created or 
developed. At present, the territory of Ukraine 
includes a number of ethnic minority regions 
that by means of political mechanisms actively 
engage in civilisational opposition.
As of 1991, three powerful groups lived in 
Ukraine: Ukrainian-speaking, Russian-speaking 
and bilingual citizens. Over the subsequent years 
no radical change took place in the linguistic 
landscape of the country.
Another tendency is the accumulation of con-
troversies and distrust of the capital city that in 
opposition to its poor and deteriorated periphery 
is becoming the place of a considerable concen-
tration of resources. Lupacìj (2006: 152) described 
the relationship between the capital city and the 
regions of Ukraine as “internal colonialism”. As 
Fig. 3. Percentage of votes in Yushchenko’s support at the 2005 presidential election
Source: http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2004/wp0011 (modified)
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a result, Kiev no longer performs transitional 
functions of a capital city and is turning into a 
metropolis.
Galicia (with its characteristic anti-communist 
and somewhat nationalistic political preferences) 
and the pro-Russian and pro-communist Crimea 
and Donbas remain controversial regions for an 
average Ukrainian.
Economic handicap 
The economic system of Ukraine was formed 
as an integral part of the so-called “single econom-
ic complex of the USSR” long before 1991. The 
latter originated from Stalin’s industrialisation 
of the early 1930s. Hence, the military-industrial 
complex with the manufacturing of arms, weap-
ons and related products took the central place in 
it. This peculiarity accounted for the creation of 
an economic mechanism based on directive plan-
ning and not market relations. Prior to 1991, the 
main objective of the Ukrainian economy was to 
ensure military equilibrium between the Warsaw 
Treaty members and the NATO members. The 
achievement of this objective presumed close co-
operation between military companies in the en-
tire Soviet Union and its satellite countries.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, conver-
sion came to the foreground. It meant a reorgan-
isation of the military production into mass-con-
sumption goods manufacturing. However, that 
process was not successful. The disruption of 
cooperation between military companies that 
found themselves in different countries after 
1991, as well as their inefficiency, uncompetitive-
ness and inability to adjust to market conditions 
led to their massive bankruptcy and only deep-
ened the economic crisis.
The distinctly military specialisation of the 
Ukrainian economy at the moment when the 
USSR collapsed largely distorted real statistical 
data. Weapons and military supplies that were 
included in statistics made a significant part of 
the GNP. However, they not only failed to show 
realistically the level of material welfare of the 
population, but with time became a burden for 
the budget as their utilisation required consider-
able expenses. According to official statistics, in 
Fig. 4. Percentage of votes in Yanukovych’s support at the 2010 presidential election
Source: http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2010/WP0011 (modified)
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1990 the GNP in Ukraine was higher than in Po-
land. However, even then an average Ukrainian 
was poorer than his/her Western neighbour.
The initial economic handicap of Ukraine was 
also connected with considerable obsoleteness of 
its manufacturing facilities. The USSR could not 
afford any major investments in their moderni-
sation because it had to catch up in the arms race 
with the USA after World War II. When Ukraine 
gained independence in 1991, main technologies 
of its companies were obsolete and required sig-
nificant investments from the state budget.
Efforts aimed to modernise the economy by 
privatisation and the introduction of market 
mechanisms did not have sufficient political sup-
port and did not lead to essential changes. In a 
competitive environment, a number of industrial 
giants went bankrupt while others, as a result of 
unfair and corrupted privatisation, passed into 
the ownership of the so-called nomenclature, 
i.e. representatives of the post-communist po-
litical elite. Lupacìj (2006: 152) claims that at the 
moment of “great privatisation” Ukraine moved 
from a bureaucratic to a clan-based corporative 
model of re-integration.
Metallurgical and chemical companies helped 
Ukraine to find a place on the international mar-
ket. The affordable cost of their products resulted 
from a relatively cheap Russian energy resources 
and extremely low-paid labour. The oligarchic 
economic model that emerged in Ukraine re-
strained a revival of the country’s economy. Oli-
garchs who managed to get control over the main 
part of production assets in a short time, actively 
influenced and determined government policies. 
In particular, they restricted the development of 
small and medium-sized businesses and sup-
pressed the emergence of the middle class.
Social and political inertness
Kul´čic´kij (2003: 41) believes that the strategic 
vector of transformation of the economic system 
is connected with dominant social values. As of 
1991, the majority of the population in Ukraine 
could be described as Soviet people, i.e. a spe-
cific form of ethnic and cultural community that 
primarily identified with the USSR and not the 
Ukrainian Socialist Republic where they actual-
ly lived. According to surveys conducted by the 
Institute of Sociology of the Ukrainian National 
Academy of Sciences, even in 2005 eight percent 
of Ukrainians still considered themselves citizens 
of the former Soviet Union (Panina 2005: 60).
As an overall reflection of the homo sovieticus1 
psychological type, Soviet people were charac-
terised by specific psycho-physical features, first 
of all by paternalism. In 1991, the majority of 
Ukrainians were not only unprepared for market 
reforms but also avoided active engagement in 
social and political life. In this context Dolìšnìj 
(2006: 115) remarked that “successful reforms 
of the country’s economy in general and the de-
velopment of an efficient administrative system 
at the national and regional levels is impossible 
without the development of a civil society.”
The oligarchy which grew out of the Commu-
nist party nomenclature and took control over 
the economy managed to expand its influence 
also to political institutions. Lack of efficient pub-
lic control and real self-government as well as the 
weakness of the democracy-oriented political op-
position facilitated systematic usurpation of po-
litical power by oligarchs. In the atmosphere of 
almost non-existent political culture and respon-
sibility, corrupt bureaucratic structures created 
to imitate the mechanisms of democratic public 
administration substituted for genuinely demo-
cratic institutions.
In this context it is appropriate to present 
peculiarities of the administrative reform in 
Ukraine as analysed by Goncâž and Gnidûk 
(2002). The authors believe that Ukrainian socie-
ty “plays the role of an anonymous background 
or a passive witness to, but not a participant of, 
events. Changes are a game in which only small 
groups of politicians from the highest circles of 
government take part, whereas citizens and spe-
cific social groups do not perform any role as far 
as the suggestion or implementation of changes 
are concerned” (Goncâž, Gnidûk 2002: 10). On 
the other hand, as Lesečko and Čemeris remark 
(2001: 98), “the administrative elite turned out to 
be unprepared for the implementation of trans-
formations or unwilling to get engaged in them”.
It is obvious that under the circumstances any 
real reforms that would restrict the power of the 
1 The term was introduced by the Russian philosopher 
zinoviev (1986).
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oligarchy and bureaucrats are impossible. In-
stead, an information fuss is being created about 
the necessity to carry out essential reforms in all 
walks of social life. As long ago as in 2002, it was 
pointed out that the nature of the post-Soviet so-
cial process is spontaneous and unmanaged, and 
is characterised by “a non-systematic reaction to 
the current situation and the influence of short-
term selfish corporate interests” (Mel´nik 2002: 
88).
Analysts tend to believe that as a result of the 
considerable social and political inertness inher-
ited from the Soviet totalitarian past, “Ukraine 
created a clumsy and inefficient system of pub-
lic administration unable to plan reforms and 
implement them, thus it did not respond to the 
needs and expectations of society at its current 
stage of development” (Timoŝuk 2002: 7).
In addition to the above-mentioned internal 
circumstances, the proximity of the Russian Fed-
eration has played an extremely important part 
in the course of transformations in Ukraine. In the 
past, the territory of Ukraine made up a consid-
erable part of the social and economic resources 
of the Russian Empire and later the Soviet Union. 
Besides, in the Russian version of history, the ter-
ritory of present-day Ukraine is seen as the cradle 
of Russian statehood. This explains the position 
of Russian pro-imperialistic political circles that 
see the return of Ukraine under the Kremlin’s po-
litical control as a key element for the renewal of 
the geopolitical power of Russia.
Although formally the Russian Federation is 
a protector of the state integrity of Ukraine, since 
1991 Ukraine has experienced a continuous and 
systematic interference of the Russian Federation 
with its affairs. Dependence on energy resources 
is the main mechanism of this influence. Recent-
ly, the range of Russian pressure on Ukraine was 
supplemented by financial dependence and eco-
nomic blackmail.
Conclusions: threats to and possible 
scenarios of a further transformation
The specific features of Ukraine’s situation de-
scribed above determined the main tendencies of 
its development in the early 1990s:
 – Emigration. The hard social and economic sit-
uation in Ukraine that has continued for more 
than twenty years, brought into being two 
main types of emigration: intellectual and la-
bour-oriented. In Ukraine the so-called brain 
drain took place on a huge scale compared 
with other countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe, and irreversibly damaged the social 
and economic future of the country. Labour 
emigration posed a similar danger and was 
even more massive. It made many econom-
ically active but unemployed people leave 
the country in search of jobs. The systematic 
curtailing of democratic liberties may give an 
impulse to another wave of emigration in the 
nearest future – political emigration. The most 
serious consequences of mass emigration from 
Ukraine include increasing depopulation as a 
result of the emigration of individuals of re-
productive age, as well as criminalisation and 
social degradation. The latter is caused by the 
spread of the incomplete family model and 
lack of systematic parental care of children 
and youth.
 – Power usurpation. The lack of democratic and 
local self-government traditions as well as 
political inertness of the majority of the pop-
ulation have created favourable conditions 
for political power usurpation. The oligarchy 
that fully controls political power in Ukraine 
at the moment has created a closed system of 
public administration and made it inaccessi-
ble for the few disloyal public and political 
institutions. Institutions of direct democracy, 
formally guaranteed by the Constitution, do 
not actually function. Methods of interfer-
ence with the expression of the political will 
of Ukrainians are widely used and range from 
bribery of voters to electoral fraud.
 – Corruption. Power usurpation which excludes 
community control over government institu-
tions has created extremely favourable condi-
tions for large-scale corruption. Under such 
circumstances, the bureaucratic system is 
fully dependent on those currently in power, 
cannot be controlled by common citizens, and 
remains immune to punishment. This favours 
a corruptive environment for almost the en-
tire population of the country. For example, 
according to a survey conducted by the socio-
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logical service of Razumkov’s Centre between 
30 September and 8 October 2013, 44.9% of 
respondents believe that “the entire govern-
ment is corrupt,” 37.4% believe that corrup-
tion in this sphere is rather widespread, and 
only 1.1% are convinced that there is no cor-
ruption (Centr Razumkova).
 – Separatism. The continuous internal disinte-
gration accounts for a permanent threat that 
certain regions and territories may secede 
from Ukraine. As Konotopcev claims (1999: 
34), in Ukraine “individual regions of the 
country are still biased towards other coun-
tries: Russia, Poland, Hungary, etc. Under 
such circumstances federalisation and decen-
tralisation create a favourable environment 
for separatism as the situation in Crimea un-
ambiguously shows”. Separatist tendencies 
in Ukraine can be explicitly connected to an 
increase of tension in relations with the Rus-
sian Federation. At the same time, there are 
also attempts to encourage separatism in oth-
er ethnically and mentally specific areas of the 
country, such as zakarpattia (Transcarpathia), 
the Romanian part of Bukovyna, and even 
Galicia.
Since 1991, Ukraine has maintained a fragile 
geopolitical equilibrium in Eurasia. At present, it 
plays the role of a buffer state between the Euro-
pean Union as a representative of Western dem-
ocratic values and the authoritarian Russian Fed-
eration, which does not conceal its expansionist 
and revanchist ambitions in relation to its for-
merly dependent territories, including Ukraine.
Besides, the destabilisation of the situation in 
Ukraine might threaten the entire region of Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe. We can identify the fol-
lowing possible scenarios for the development of 
the situation in Ukraine: 
1. Inert, which presumes the preservation of the 
status quo with Ukraine as a buffer state be-
tween the European Union and the Russian 
Federation.
2. Optimal or Central European, which implies 
gradual integration of Ukraine into the EU 
structures. The political crisis in Ukraine in 
the late 2013 /early 2014 demonstrated that 
supporters of the pro-European course are 
both numerous and publicly and politically 
active. A profound political crisis complicated 
by a mounting economic collapse can lead to a 
change of the governing political elite, even if 
this process contradicts the expectations of the 
Russian Federation and involves large-scale 
blackmail (from commercial to military).
3. Destructive or Belarusian, which is connected 
with intensive subordination of Ukraine to 
the Russian Federation. It will be possible if 
the European Union opts out of the Ukrainian 
problem and Russian geopolitical expansion 
continues. The implementation of this scena-
rio would include an increase in the financial 
and economic dependence of Ukraine on the 
Kremlin. It will lead to a further departure 
from democratic mechanisms of administra-
tion in favour of the authoritative model of 
Belarusian type.
4. Catastrophic or Balkan, which may lead to a 
territorial disintegration of the country into 
what we may tentatively call a pro-European 
and a pro-Russian part.
Each of the scenarios is fraud with significant 
dangers and threats, not only to Ukraine and the 
neighbouring countries, but also to all countries 
of the European Union.
In a short-term perspective of a year or two, 
we can expect the deepening of the social and 
economic crisis in Ukraine. It will be accompa-
nied by an increased pressure of the Russian Fed-
eration on political processes in the country and 
will boost internal conflicts in it. Energy resourc-
es will remain the key to economic and probably 
also political dependence of Ukraine upon the 
Russian Federation. Besides, other weak aspects 
of modern Ukraine will be used as a tool for its 
subordination.
In a mid-term perspective of the nearest ten 
years or so, we can expect serious changes on the 
global market of energy resources that will weak-
en the geopolitical role of the Russian Federation. 
Economic threats causing a decrease in the cost of 
energy resources on the world market are com-
parable to the processes that took place during 
the final years of the USSR. Without exaggeration 
they can give rise to a large-scale social and eco-
nomic crisis in Russia that will lead to a change of 
its governing political elite.
In a long-term perspective, both Ukraine and 
the Russian Federation will complete the pro-
cess of transformation from totalitarianism to 
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democracy that started in the late Soviet period. 
Unfortunately, it is hard to predict what the cost 
of these transformations will be and whether the 
existing states will keep their current borders. 
These changes will be a precondition for the in-
clusion of both countries into the orbit of the Eu-
ropean geopolitical body. The European integra-
tion of Ukraine and Russia will take place almost 
simultaneously and will close the transformation 
of entire Central and Eastern Europe from totali-
tarianism to democracy.
Taking into consideration the specific situ-
ation of modern Ukraine, it is possible to state 
that, compared with other countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe, the process of its democratic 
transformation is characterised by the following 
three essential aspects: relatively long duration, 
simultaneity of all the transformation phases (as 
described in Mach’s classification), and their fre-
quent non-linear transitions.
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